As the H5N1 ostrich debacle in British Columbia has come to a close, part of me wants to ignore all the crap that’s coming in, but there’s value in recapping and trying to move forward.
Quick catchup….the flock was infected with H5N1 influenza in Dec 2024. Contrary to legal requirements, the farm hid the issue and didn’t do anything that would be required in response to this high consequence virus. It’s been reported that 69 birds died and 300-400 remained (they never could come up with an exact number). When it was discovered, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) got involved, as is their mandate. As per standard approaches to H5N1 in poultry (which ostriches are considered by international designation), a cull order was issued. However, the farm fought back and did so by suing and appealing, while taking no infection control practices (including posing with the birds without PPE and inviting a convoy onto the grounds). Ultimately, it made it to the Supreme Court of Canada, which issued a temporary stay order, but then declined to take up the case. As a result, CFIA culled the herd.
First off, the ostriches are the victims here. They had bad luck in being exposed to H5N1 and being in a situation that had little chance of avoiding a standard cull because of the mess of a farm they lived on. This moved quickly from being about disease to being about politics and fundraising, and the birds got caught in the middle.
Why was a cull done?
A cull is a standard approach to this virus because of the risk to animals and people. It’s done to contain it and reduce the risk of further transmission to birds, spillover into mammals (which increases the risk of adaptation to mammals), infection of people (this virus has a high mortality rate historically) and, most concerningly, recombination with other animal and human flu viruses. That’s how all pandemic flu viruses originate.
Were these birds infectious?
In December, yes. This group was probably highly biohazardous and at great risk of infecting wild birds, wild mammals and any people or domestic animals on the farm. It was subsequently determined that the strain that was involved was a variant that has caused human infection and had some potentially concerning mutations.
Were they infectious when they were culled?
Probably not. In a group like this, flu probably burned through in January or February. Longterm shedding of flu virus in an infected bird is unlikely, so for there to be a risk there would have to be continued circulation of the virus. With a group this size and over 10 months, that realistically means birds would have to get reinfected to sustain transmission.
Can that happen?
Maybe. Probably not, but ‘probably’ isn’t an acceptable threshold for this disease. If we don’t know the virus is gone, prudence would dictate we assume it’s still there. That’s the approach that CFIA (understandably) takes.
Was there an alternative?
Maybe. It’s a big ‘maybe’ with lots of caveats. While culling is the international expectation, countries can take alternative approaches if they can show adequate containment. That’s not defined so it’s a tough grey area for a regulatory agency that doesn’t like to dance in the grey zone. It would require solid isolation, strict infection control practices, testing, monitoring and documentation. That’s tough in general. It’s really tough with outdoor birds and uncooperative owners.
What could be done with an alternate approach?
At the time the outbreak was happening, it would have been fair to say it’s not reasonable. The risks are too high with that setup.
10 months later (after the ball had been dropped, but that’s where we were) testing could make more sense. That’s not easy, though. These are big birds that can do a lot of damage to people handling them, especially when there are poor (to non-existent) handling facilities. Sticking a swab down the throat of a large bird that can split you open with a kick is hard to sell.
If we could test them, we’d have to be able to catch them all, identify them all, sample them and get negative results for all. That’s theoretically possible, and if there were zero positives, I’d be pretty confident the group is negative.
However, there’d likely be a need for ongoing monitoring and confidence in that. Since the farm hid the disease initially and has shown no interest in disease control, it would be hard to convince anyone that’s an effective approach.
Further, even if WOAH (the World Organization for Animal Health) thought the approach was OK, that doesn’t mean all countries would. Any country could restrict importation of BC or Canadian poultry (or other food products) on the premise that Canada has shown it cannot protect its food supply. Even if it’s a dodgy claim, a country with an agenda or that wants leverage for negotiations could play that card…..successfully.
When there’s potential risk to animals, humans and multi-billion dollar industry, the bar is obviously going to be high.
So, is it possible? Yes. Easy? No.
Easy shouldn’t be a requirement but it’s not just that it’s a hassle, it’s that it might not be possible.
What about the research value of these birds?
The farm has talked a lot about how these are no longer meat birds. They’re a ‘research floc’k. However, they’ve not been able to present any viable information about valid research that’s been done. They haven’t indicated that there’s ethics approval for research on the farm (a basic requirement for research involving animals). They don’t even know how many birds they had or have any form of identification (tags, microchips). If you don’t know who’s who and don’t even know how many birds you have, this is not a legitimate research operation.
These birds survived H5N1 flu. Was there research value?
Not much. Yes, these survived. We don’t know how many fought off the infection (something we know many birds of some species do) or weren’t actually exposed. The birds that survived an infection may have antibodies against H5N1, but so would any other animal that survived or was experimentally infected. So, there’s not a lot of unique value here.
What about herd immunity?
For the supporters who were comprised of a large proportion of anti-vax (and anti-PCR, and anti-public health and some people that don’t believe viruses exist), they put a lot of attention on herd immunity (which is something we try to achieve through vaccination). It’s very unlikely this group was immune to H5N1. Those that were exposed and fought off the infection would have some immunity, but we know that immunity to influenza after natural infection isn’t great or longlasting. That’s why we can get it repeatedly. Some of the birds might have been immune, or at reduced chance of severe disease. Some were probably previously infected but are not immune. Some might not have been exposed and are not immune. As a group, it’s very likely that there would be susceptibility to re-infection if there’s another exposure.
Where do we go from here?
Hopefully we can look back and get something positive from this mess and unfortunate ending for the birds. There are a few key components.
The Supreme Court has re-inforced the appropriateness of CFIA’s disease response. This is important since it might reduce the chance of future lower court successes with appeals and stays. It’s fair to have oversight and to criticize CFIA. It’s also fair for CFIA to say ‘we have to contain this disease for the protection of animals and people, and we need to do it quickly’. No one at CFIA celebrates when they have to cull. They do it as an unfortunate but necessary part of their mandate to protect animal health, human health, agriculture and the food supply. Allowing people with agendas to weaponize the court system creates risk.
There may be valid arguments for approaches other than a cull, in certain situations, as this is now an endemic disease. However, this needs to be done carefully, with a lot of transparency, effort, structure and excellent care. In other words, exactly the opposite of what was done here. A mechanism to promptly evaluate a potential alternative, with a clear approach, set criteria to review (what, who…), a very rapid response and no appeal process would be interesting to investigate.
As part of that, there needs to be excellent interim containment. If a farm wants to convince CFIA to take a different approach, they need to do absolutely everything possible to contain the problem while this occurs. If it can be done with minimal risk, it’s potentially viable. If it creates risk in the interim, it’s not. Even if this farm had done the exact opposite of what they did, and diagnosed the issue quickly, reported it, properly disposed of dead birds and enacted strict infection control practices, it’s debatable whether an exemption during the acute disease period would have been viable. You can’t contain a few hundred large birds (producing lots of virus-laden snot and feces) outside in an area with abundant wild birds, and with no indoor isolation options and handling facilities.
If you don’t have an appropriate facility and management, it’s not an option. That’s not CFIA’s fault. That’s a choice by the farm about how they operate. Raising birds outdoors isn’t bad, it just create risk that any farm needs to accept. And when that results in disease, there are consequences.
We had a high consequence virus on this farm, they handled it horribly, the virus in question had some mutations that created even more risk, and nothing bad seemed to have come from it (that we know of, at least). Does that mean none of this makes sense?
No. We got lucky. You only get lucky so many times with a high consequence infectious disease that has pandemic potential.
It’s really sad how infectious disease control (and beyond) has gotten so politicized. This went from an issue with one group of infected birds to having a convoy on the (quarantined) farm, massive misinformation, dodgy ‘media’ stirring up hate, threats to experts and people doing their jobs, massive fundraising and grift, largely by people who likely don’t give a crap whatsoever about those ostriches. It also cost the taxpayers a huge amount of money. The ostriches were political pawns and an excuse to complain, raise money and have a party at the farm. We need to move beyond that component of this issue and come back to the valid disease control questions that can and should be discussed going forward.
















